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More than forty years ago, Kato[1957] posed the organ bank hypothesis.  Namely, he 
stressed that in prewar Japan, many of the banks were tightly connected with certain 
industrial companies, and those banks loosely gave loans to the connected companies, 
which eventually resulted in the Showa Financial Crisis.  This view has been widely 
accepted by economic historians.  However, there has been no attempt to test the organ 
bank hypothesis quantitatively.  In this paper, we tested the organ bank hypothesis using 
quantitative data and econometrical methodology.   
First, we compiled a comprehensive database of company directors and auditors, 
based on Zenkoku Shogaisha Yakuinroku 1926 issue(Shogyo Koshinjo[1926]), and using the 
database we identified the  interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and 
non -banking companies.   Interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and 
non -banking companies  was very pervasive.  Nearly 90% of ordinary banks had more than 
one directors or auditors who were at the same time directors or auditors of non-banking 
companies, and average number of interlocking per bank was as large as 7.85.  Observing 
by banks scale, we found that interlocking was more pervasive in the large-sized banks.         
     Second, using the interlocking variables, we examine the influence of interlocking on 
bank performance.  Through regression analyses we found that interlocking tended to give 
negative effect on the liquidity performance and profitability of banks, and increased the 
probability of bank closures in 1927.  Also, the interest rates of the deposits of those banks 
with interlocking were relatively high, while the interest rate of loans were not, and 
consequently profit margins of those banks were relatively small.  It implies that the banks 
with interlocking should offer relatively high interest rate to gather deposits, because of the 
low evaluation of the financial market. 
     Those findings support the organ bank hypothesis.  In prewar Japan, banks’ business 
practices based on connection of the  directors and auditors made the banking system 
unsound, and eventually caused the Showa Financial Crisis in 1927.  On the other hand, 
many of the literature on the Asian Crisis in 1997 stress exploitation of the minority 
shareholders by the core members of the family-based companies. In this sense, the Showa 
Financial Crisis was a predecessor of the Asian Crisis in 1997 1.Introduction 
     As a background of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, corporate governance has been 
attracting attentions of researchers as well as policy makers.  Corporate governance deals 
with the ways in which activities of corporate managers increase the profit of suppliers of 
finance to corporations (Shleifer and Vishney[1997]).      Specifically, many of the literature 
on the Asian Crisis focuses on exploitation of the minority shareholders by the core 
members of the family-based companies (Claessens et al.[1998]; Lang[2001]).  We do not 
suppose that the family-based companies always cause exploitation of minority 
shareholders,  because the companies affiliated to zaibatsu in prewar Japan basically 
outperformed the other companies in terms of ROE (Okazaki[1999] and [2001]).  However, 
zaibatsu is only one aspect of the prewar Japanese corporate system.   Besides major 
zaibatsu, there existed many medium and small-sized corporate groups, and also there 
existed numerous medium and small-sized companies.    
Concerning those corporate groups other than major zaibatsu, it is widely accepted by 
the economic historians that many banks were tightly connected with certain industrial 
companies.  Those banks connected to the industrial companies are called “organ banks” 
(kikan ginko).   According to the accepted view, those banks loosely gave loans to the 
connected companies, which came to be bad loans ex post.   This means that the managers 
of organ banks tended to neglect interests of the depositors and minority shareholders.  
This agency problem of organ banks has been thought to be the major cause of the financial 
crisis in 1927 (Showa Financial Crisis) (Teranishi[2000]).      
  If this widely accepted view, the “organ bank hypothesis” hereafter, is the case, the 
minority shareholders and depositors of the  “organ banks” were exploited by the core 
members of the corporate groups, and in this sense the Japanese financial crisis in 1927 was 
a predecessor of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997.  Testing this “organ bank hypothesis” is 
the basic motivation of our research.  It is worth investigating, not only because it is 
relevant to the contemporary governance issue in Asian economy, but also because it is 
concerning the most fundamental hypothesis on the prewar Japanese financial history.   
The literature which stressed the concept of the  “organ bank ” for the first time is 
Kato[1957].  According to Kato[1957], the organ bank was the bank which was established 
in order to raise funds for the industrial businesses of the bank founders, and therefore the 
organ bank was not managed only for the profit of the bank itself.  Consequently, the organ 
bank tended to give large amount of long-term loans to the small number of the industrial 
companies which connected to the bank founders (Sugiyama[1976]; Murakami[1983]).   
As mentioned above, the organ bank relationship has been regarded as a major cause of 
the Showa Financial Crisis.  For example, just after the crisis, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) wrote in its research report that the fundamental cause of the bankruptcy of the banks was “the 
weakness of our industrial organization and banking system”(Bank of Japan [1933], p.984).  
BOJ  pointed out the following unsound practices of the banks.  The bank directors 
participated in the other businesses and made use of the bank as an instrument for financing 
their businesses.  And, as a result of the loan policy based on the connections, the banks 
gave large amount of loans to certain persons or companies without reliable collaterals. 
Also, Takahashi and Morigaki[1968], one of the most well-known book on the Showa 
Financial Crisis, identified the organ bank relationship as a major cause of it.   
After Kato’s seminal work, the research has progressed in the following two directions.  
The first direction is case studies of the organ bank relationship.  In 1960’s and 1970’s, the 
main focus of the these researches was the characteristics of the banks affiliated to major 
zaibatsu.  Ka to[1957] discussed that most of the banks in prewar Japan, including those 
affiliated to major zaibatsu, had the characteristics of the organ bank in common.  On the 
other hand, Shibagaki[1965] stressed that the zaibatsu affiliated banks did not gave large 
amount of loans to the core companies in the same groups.  Owing to the contribution of 
Imuta[1966] and Sugiyama[1976], it has come to the consensus that apart from exceptional 
periods, the zaibatsu affiliated banks were not the organ banks of zaibatsu in Kato’s sense 
(Murakami[1983]).  Concerning non-zaibatsu banks, Imuta[1976a], Ishii[1999] and 
Yamazaki[2000] carried out case studies of several typical organ banks, based on the 
research by BOJ and the original documents.   
The second direction is the statistical analysis of the bank performance.  Imuta[1976b] 
classified banks into several groups by scale and location, and compared the basic financial 
indices among those groups to find that the financial conditions of the medium-sized banks 
in the cities were relatively bad.  They were characterized by high loan-deposit ratio, high 
borrowing-deposit ratio etc.  Teranishi[1982] reported the similar results, using the more 
comprehensive data set.  Meanwhile, Yabushita and Inoue[1993] analyzed the influence of 
bank performance on bank closure in 1927.  Thorough Probit analysis of bank closures, 
they found that low equity-deposit ratio, high loan-deposit ratio and low ROE increased the 
probability of bank closure.                    
  Based on the brief survey, in this paper, we intend to integrate those two directions of 
the researches.  For this purpose, first, we construct the variables which objectively indicate 
the organ bank relationship.   As is explained in detail later, we compile a comprehensive 
database of directors and auditors in 1926, just before the Showa Financial Crisis, and using 
it, we identify interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and non-banking 
companies.  Then we transform the interlocking information into some variables indicating 
each bank’s relationship with non-banking companies.  This is the first attempt to measure the extension of organ bank relationship quantitatively.  Next, using those interlocking 
variables, we check the influence of the organ bank relationship on the bank performance, in 
order to test the above mentioned organ bank hypothesis. 
  This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 briefly addresses the prewar history of 
the Japanese banking industry.  Section 3  summarizes the characteristics of the market 
structure of the banking industry in 1926.  In section 4, we explain our database of directors 
and auditors, and the findings derived from it, concerning the interlocking between banks 
and non -banking companies.  Section 5 econometrically analyzes the influence of the 
interlocking on the bank performance.  Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. A brief history of the prewar baking industry 
     The modern history of the banking industry in Japan started in 1873, when the 
National Bank Act was enacted.  National  banks were the private banks which were 
privileged to issue bank notes.   Inasmuch as this  privilege, at first, few applications for 
establishing national banks were submitted to the government.  This was basically because 
the national bank notes were convertible to gold, and therefore national banks should have 
large amount of gold reserve (Asakura[1988] pp.34-36).    
In order to stimulate establishment of national banks, the government revised the 
National Bank Act in 1876.   By the revision,  convertibility of the national bank notes was 
suspended, and at the same time, government non-convertible notes were authorized to be 
the reserve of the national bank, which made it profitable as a business (Asakura [1988] 
pp.36-37; Teranishi [1982] pp.35-37).  After that, number of national banks increased 
rapidly to be 153, the upper limit prescribed by the National Bank Act in 1879(Figure 1).  
While ex-samurai were the major shareholders of national banks at first, the share of 
merchants and landowners increased gradually (Teranishi [1982] pp.74-78).   
 In 1882, the Bank of Japan was established as the central bank, and corresponding to it, 
the National Bank Act was revised again, which obliged each national bank to transform 
into an ordinary bank within twenty years from its establishment.   By 1899, 122 of the 153 
national banks converted into ordinary banks, 16 were merged, and the  others were 
dissolved or closed (Teranishi[1982] p.37).    
 Based on those measures, the government enacted the Bank Act in 1893, which brought 
about rapid increase of ordinary banks (Figure 1).   At the end of 1901, the number of 
ordinary banks came to be as large as 1890, which was the peak in the prewar period.  
Many ordinary banks located in Kanagawa, Hyogo, Niigata, Miyagi, Sizuoka, Nagano etc as 
well as in the two major cities, Tokyo and Osaka.  Kanagawa and Hyogo had the 
international ports, and the other prefectures were specialized in agriculture, which suggests that the major activities of ordinary banks in early times were related to the 
international trade and agriculture (Asakura [1988] pp.51-52).  
 Besides the Bank Act, the legal framework for the savings bank, the Savings Bank Act, 
was provided in 1893.  The savings bank was prescribed as the bank which gathered funds 
by small lots deposits less than 5 yen per lot and loaned them with national bonds as 
collateral.  By the revision of the Savings Bank Act in 1895, the restriction of fund 
application was removed (Aasakura[1988] pp.57-64).     
 While deposits, as well as the number, of ordinary banks increased, the ratio of deposits 
to banks’ equity remained low until early twentieth century (Figure 2).  In fact, the equity 
accounted for 36 % of the total liabilities of ordinary banks in 1901.  In other words, one 
aspect of the ordinary banks’ activities in those days, was loaning their own funds, and in 
this sense their attribute was different from that of the modern banks based on deposits.    
The ratio of deposits increased remarkably in 1900’s.  Since 1897, the Bank of Japan 
changed its lending policy.  Until then, it easily gave loans to the private banks. As a result, 
ordinary banks heavily depended upon borrowings from BOJ, and they earned profits by 
the interest rate spread between the borrowings from BOJ and loans to private companies.  
In 1897, BOJ started loaning to the non-banking companies and individuals, in order to 
checking the banks to earn  profit from the spread between the BOJ’s interest rate and the 
market rate (Bank of Japan [1983a] p.16).  This policy change urged ordinary banks to 
decrease borrowings from BOJ and gather deposits seriously.   
At the same time, concentration rate of the banking industry started to rise (Figure 3).  
As mentioned above, since 1901, number of ordinary banks began to decrease.  The Major 
reason of decrease in 1900’s was close, bankruptcy and dissolution (Table 1).  Many banks 
were bankrupted and closed in the bank panics in 1901, 1907 etc.   
     In 1910’s, the First World War gave substantial influence on the banking industry, as 
well  as on the Japanese economy as a whole.  In this period, bank deposits increased 
rapidly, due to expansion of the economy and the loose monetary policy based on huge 
surplus of international balance of payments.  Consequently, the ratio of deposit to the 
total liabilities of ordinary banks came to be around 80% at the end of 1910’s, while that of 
the equity became less than 20 % (Figure 2).  In other words, the Japanese ordinary banks 
came close to the modern banks based on deposits in terms of the composition of the 
liabilities.   
On the other hand, many ordinary banks gave large amount of loans to those 
companies which rapidly expanded businesses, especially the business of heavy and 
chemical industries, in the boom during the War.   In many cases, those businesses were 
faced with difficulties, when the War ended and the international competition renewed, which, in turn, made the bank loans bad credit.  Because the ratio of deposits to the total 
liabilities had risen in 1910’s as mentioned above, the deterioration of the banks’ assets 
made the financial conditions of the banks seriously bad, which came to be the basic 
condition of the instability of the financial market in 1920’s  
Teranishi and Yokoyama[1998] estimated the gross value-added (GVA) of the banking 
sector in prewar Japan.  Figure 4 shows GVA of the ordinary banks from 1919 to 1940.  
The decrease of GVA in the second half of 1920's indicates the difficulty of the banking 
industry in this period.   
In the bank panic in 1920, many banks, especially small-sized banks, were obliged to be 
closed.  In order to secure stability of the financial market, the government started to 
reform the industrial organization of the banking industry in early 1920’s.   To begin with, 
the Savings Bank Law was promulgated in 1921, which strengthened the restriction on fund 
application of the savings banks again (Asakura[1988] pp.124-125).  Corresponding to the 
new law, many of the savings banks converted into ordinary banks, which was reflected in 
the increase of ordinary banks in Figure 1.  
However, the earthquake which attacked Tokyo in 1923, made the financial market 
still more instable.  By the earthquake, huge amount of assets which were collateral of bank 
loans, or were expected to produce cash flow to repay the loans, were destroyed and burnt 
down.  Just after the earthquake, the government enacted the “Act for Compensation of the 
Deficit by Discounting the Earthquake Bills”, and according to it, instructed BOJ to discount 
the bills of the banks in Tokyo area, in order to prevent bank panics.  The bills discounted 
by this measure were called the “Earthquake Bills.”  Contrary to the intension of the 
government, this measure retarded the disposal of bad credit of banks, because those bills 
recognized as the  “Earthquake Bills” included the deteriorated bills not relating to the 
earthquake (Bank of Japan [1983b] pp.58-61; Takahashi and Morigaki [1968] pp.141-149).   
In 1926, the government intended to take fundamental measures to restructure the 
financial system.   For this purpose, the government proposed two law drafts to dispose of 
the  “Earthquake Bills,” and meanwhile  prepared the draft of the new Bank Law.   
However, the diet opposed to the two law drafts, on the ground that they were favorable for 
the capitalists connected to the government.  And in the discussion at the diet, the Minister 
of Finance made a notorious slip of tongue to say that a certain bank had closed that 
morning, which caused the financial crisis in 1927.         
The Showa Financial Crisis in 1927 was the largest crisis in the financial history of 
Japan.  45 banks were closed because of the rush for repaying deposits (Table 2).   The 
share of closed banks was 2.91 % of ordinary banks and savings banks in terms number, and 
9.02 % in terms of deposits amount.  Among the closed banks was Jugo Bank, which was one of the top ten banks, and had a transaction with the Imperial Family.  Also, Taiwan 
Bank was the special bank for  developing Taiwan, and was the central bank there.  
Magnitude of the financial crisis can be observed quantitatively thorough shift of deposits 
from banks to the postal bureau.  In 1927, while the outstanding of the total deposits of the 
all banks decreased, the postal deposits increased by 30.1 % (Figure 4).      
After the crisis, the new Bank Law was enacted in 1928.  By the Bank Law, the 
ordinary bank should have a form of joint-stock company, and the paid-in capital should be 
over one million yen1.  The existing banks whose paid-in capital was under the lower limit, 
“unqualified banks,” should clear it within seven years.   When the Bank Law was enacted, 
617 of 1,283 ordinary banks became  “unqualified banks, and eventually the number of 
“unqualified banks” came to be 631 because of capital decrease (Bank of Japan [1983b] 
pp.280-281).   
At the same time, the ordinary bank was prohibited from the other businesses except 
those relating to the banking business.  Also, the executive directors and managers of the 
ordinary bank were prohibited from the other businesses.  The restriction of the subsidiary 
businesses of the bank itself and its directors reflected the recognition of the government 
that the organ bank relationship was the basic cause of the unsound financial system.       
Concerning the “unqualified banks,” the government did not approve increase of 
capital by itself in principle, and urged them to merge with other banks.  Therefore, 340 of 
631 “unqualified banks,” were merged, while only 50 banks cleared the criterion by capital 
increase.  Most of the others were  dissolved.  Consequently, number of ordinary banks 
decreased swiftly since late 1920’s, to be 424 in 1936.  In this sense, the financial crisis and 
the Bank Law drastically changed the organization of the banking industry.  In the next 
section, we summarize the characteristics of the industrial organization just before the 
change. 
 
3. Summary of the industrial organization in 1926 
According to Ministry of Finance [1928], there were 1,420 ordinary banks at the end of 
1926, over 10 times as many as 136 banks in 2000.  Out of the 1,420 ordinary banks, we 
select 1,402 banks for our primary samples, whose financial data in Ministry of 
Finance[1928]are complete.  
In Figure 5, the vertical axis denotes the logarithm value of [deposit + equity], and the 
horizontal axis denotes the rank of banks in terms of [deposit + equity].  The slope of the 
diagram indicates the distribution of the bank scale.  While the slope is steep both in higher 
                                                                   
1  Two million yen in Tokyo and Osaka, while five hundred thousand yen in the town and 
village whose population was smaller that ten thousand. ranks and in lower ranks, the slope in between is relatively flat, which means that there 
were math of medium-sized banks.  The Herfindahl index of loan was 0.016 in 1926, and 
that of deposit was 0.019.  The highly competitive market structure is the remarkable 
characteristics of the banking industry in prewar Japan.   
The literatures have paid attention to the relation between the bank performance and 
the scale.  To examine this point, we regressed each bank’s financial indices on its scale in 
terms of [deposit + equity].  The indices we use are CAPDEP (=equity/deposit), 
LOANDEP (=loan/deposit) and RESDEP (=reserve/deposit).  CAPDEP indicates solvency 
to depositors.  LOANDEP is an index of the liquidity.  If LOANDEP is over 1, the bank 
was in the situation of “over-loan.”   
RESDEP is another index of liquidity, while it indicates also solvency to depositors at 
the same time.  Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of these three financial indices, the 
correlation matrix of the variables,  and the results of OLS regression.  The skewness and 
excess kurtosis are very high.  This suggests there might be outliers in our observations, 
which should be taken into account in executing regression analysis . 
In Equation-1 (the dependent variable is CAPDEP), the coefficient of scale is negative 
and statistically significant (p-value is 0.00).  In other words, the ratio of equity to deposits 
tends to be smaller in larger banks.  In Equation -2 (the dependent variable is LOANDEP), 
the estimated coefficient of scale is not statistically significant.  As shown in descriptive 
statistics, the average LOANDEP is 2.06 and the median of that is 1.21.  This implies that 
banks over half of all were in the situation of over-loan, regardless of scale.  In other words, 
over-loan was universal in the banking industry in prewar Japan.  In Equation-3 (the 
dependent variable is RESDEP), the coefficient of scale is negative and statistically 
significant, although the significance level is not high.  This implies that liquidity was 
lower in larger banks, which is consistent with the result concerning CAPDEP. 
In order to examine the relation between the closure of each bank in 1927 and its scale, 
we split our 1,402 observations into three groups in terms of paid-in capital following 
Teranishi[1982], namely, LARGE, MEDIUM and SMALL.  ALL is the group which includes 
all of these three groups.  There were numerous small-sized banks whose paid-in capital 
was less than 1 million yen.  Table 4 shows the number of bank closure in each group.  In 
LARGE, 25 banks closed in 1927, which are over half of the bank closures in ALL.  In other 
words, the damage of the financial crisis in 1927 was more serious for the larger banks.  
This is not surprising, because solvency of banks in higher ranks were worse than that in 
lower banks according to Table 2.   
 
4.Governance structure of the ordinary banks      As we pointed out in Section 1, there has been no attempt to measure the extension of 
the organ bank relationship quantitatively.  We approach this task by compiling a 
comprehensive database of directors and auditors of banks and non-banking companies.  
The data  source is Shogyo Koshinjo [1926] ( Zenkoku Shogaisha Yakuinroku, 1926 issue).  
Shogyo Koshinjo was the first private credit bureau established in Japan.  It published 
Zenkoku Shogaisha Yakuinroku every year from 1893 to 1944.  Zenkoku Shogaisha Yakuinroku is 
remarkable, not only because it continued to be published for a long time, but also because 
it had rich information of the wide-ranging companies (Yui and Asano [1989].  It covers 
large number of banks, non-banking joint-stock companies, and non-banking partnership 
companies in Japan, and also it  provided with the  information of company name, 
establishment year, capital, name and address of the directors, auditors and major 
employees, concerning each of those banks and companies. 
     We have already several important literature which utilized  Zenkoku Shogaisha 
Yakuinroku.  Wada, Kobayakawa and Shiomi [1992a], [1992b], [1993], and Kobayakawa, 
Suzuki and Wada [1999a], [1999b], compiled the databases of directors based on 1898, 1907, 
1918 issues of the  Zenkoku Shogaisha Yakuinroku to identify the networks of directors and 
investors in each period.   Meanwhile, using the database of Kobayakawa, Suzuki and 
Wada [1999a], Miwa and Ramseyer [2000] analyzed the monitoring role of the “prominent 
directors,” namely those who had the post of directors of multiple companies, in the cotton 
spinning industry in late nineteenth century.      
     On the other hand, in this paper, we focus on the interlocking between banks and 
non -banking companies, and we not only identify the interlocking, but also examine the 
influence of the interlocking on bank performance using the database.  Since our primary 
purpose is testing the organ bank hypothesis, as the object year we select 1926, just before 
the Showa Financial Crisis, which has been believed to be caused by the organ bank 
relationship.  We newly compiled a database of directors, based on the 1926 issue of 
Zenkoku Shogaisha Yakuinroku.           
     There are the data of 16,558 companies including banks in Shogyo Koshinjo [1926].  
15,060 of them were in the today’s territory of Japan, and the other 1,498 were located in 
Karafuto, Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria and other foreign countries.  Out of 15,060 companies 
in Japan, 1427 were banks, 11,578 were non-banking joint-stock companies and 2,055 were 
non -banking partnership companies.  We can check the coverage of Shogyo Kishinjo [1926], 
by comparing the number of observations mentioned above, with the number of companies 
in Ministry of Industry and Commerce [1928] ( Kaisha Tokeihyo, 1 926 issue).  Kaisha 
Tokeihyo was the corporate statistics, edited by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, 
based on the census survey, in accordance with the Corporate Statistics Act.              According to Ministry of Industry and Commerce [1928], there were 36,068 companies 
including banks in Japan2 at the end of 1926 (Table 5).  1,506 of them were banks, 16,251 
were non-banking joint-stock companies, and 18,311 were non-banking partnership 
companies.  Therefore, the coverage ratio of Shogyo Koshinjo  [1926] is 41.8 % 
(15,060/36,068) in terms of company number.  The coverage ratio of banks and the 
non -banking joint-stock companies are as high as 94.8% and 71.2% respectively.  On the 
other hand, that of non -banking partnership companies is only 11.2 %.  The low coverage 
ratio of non-banking partnership companies is a weakness of Shogyo Koshinjo [1926], 
especially for researches concerning family-based companies.   However, according to 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce [1928], in terms of capital amount,  the share of 
non -banking partnership companies was only 10.4% of the total3.  Small capital share of the 
non -banking partnership companies mitigates the weakness of Shogyo Koshinjo [1926].      
     In identifying the interlocking between banks and non-banking  companies  using our 
database of directors and auditors, we select  the common set of the ordinary banks in 
Shogyo Koshinjo [1926] and those in Ministry of Finance [1928] as our sample banks.  In the 
common set are 1,191 ordinary banks.  Since we excluded 9 observations of which 
CAPDEP are over 9.4 (the average plus one S.E.) as outliers out of the 1,191 observations, 
then our sample banks comes to be 1,182.  The basic statistics of the 1,182 observations is 
reported in Table 6.   
     Table 7 shows the e xtension of interlocking between banks and non-banking 
companies.  Those banks more than one of whose directors or auditors had the post of 
directors or auditors, were as many as 87.3 % of the total observations 4.  Also, the average 
number of interlocking per bank was as large as 7.85 (Table 8-a).  We can safely say that 
most of the ordinary banks were connected with non-banking companies thorough 
interlocking of directors and auditors.    
Table 8-a also shows the data broken down by the position in the non-banking 
companies.  We classified the positions of directors and auditors into four categories, 
namely 1) top manager (president, chairman, etc), 2) executive director, 3) ordinary director, 
and 4) auditor5.  While it is natural that the ratio and number  of interlocking are large 
concerning ordinary directors of the non-banking companies, remarkably enough, in 46.5 % 
of the observations, more than one of directors or auditors were the top managers of the 
                                                                   
2  The territory of Japan today. 
3  The share of banks is 16.2%, and that of non-banking joint-stock companies is 73.4 %. 
4  If we use data of Shibuya et al.[1983], the percentage is 58.8%.  The implication of it will 
be discussed in Appendix1. 
5  Some companies did not have a president or chairman.  In this case, we identified the 
executive director as a top manager. non -banking companies.   
Table 7-b,c,d,e show the data broken down by the position in the banks.  In 57.7% of 
the observations, top managers of the banks had the position of director or auditor of the 
non -banking companies.  Also, the average number of interlocking of banks’ top managers 
was 2.11.   The ratio of banks more than one of whose ordinary directors had the position 
of director or auditor of the non-banking companies, was 72.6 %.  And the ratio of the 
banks, more than one of whose ordinary directors were the top managers of the 
non -banking companies was 29.4 %.       
     Table 8 is a break down of Table 7 by the scale of banks.  Like in Section 3, we divided 
the 1,182 observations into three groups in terms of paid-in capital, following 
Teranishi[1982].  There were numerous small-sized banks whose paid-in capital was less 
than 1 million yen.  The first point to be stressed in Table 8 is that interlocking with 
non -banking companies was quite pervasive in all of the three groups.  In other words, 
interlocking was universal phenomenon across the groups of banks classified by scale. 
Second, at the same time, relatively speaking, interlocking was clearly more pervasive 
in the large-sized group.  The ratio of the banks with interlocking as well as the average 
number of interlocking, were largest in the large-sized group, and smallest in the 
small-sized group. 
    The same characteristics is observed, when we break down the data by the position in 
the non-banking companies.  In any sub-category of the data, both the ratio of the banks 
with interlocking and the average number of interlocking, were largest in the large-sized 
group (Table 8-a).  Furthermore, even when we break down the data by the position in the 
banks, the situation is the same (Table 8-b,c,d,e).   
     Those results extracted from our database are really striking.  Nearly 90% of ordinary 
banks were connected to non-banking companies thorough interlocking of directors and 
auditors.  Also, interlocking was more pervasive in the large-sized banks.  Our result 
supports the conjecture of Kato [1957] concerning pervasiveness of the organ bank 
relationship. 
 
5. Influence of the governance structure to the bank performance 
In this section, in order to test the "organ bank" hypothesis, we quantify the influence 
of the governance structure of each bank on its performance.  For this purpose, the 
following three regression  analyses are executed.  First, we analyze the causality between 
the governance structure  of each bank and its probability of closure in the financial crisis of 
1927.  In this analysis, we construct the interlocking variable based on our database, and 
add the variables to the framework of Yabushita and Inoue [1993].  Second, we regress the basic financial indices of each bank on its interlocking variables.  Third, we regress the 
interest rates of each bank on its interlocking variables to check the influence of the 
governance structure of each bank on its evaluation in the financial market. 
First, Yabushita and Inoue [1993] reported the results of Probit analysis that low 
CAPDEP, high LOANDEP, low RESDEP and low ROE increased the probability of bank 
closure in 1927.  In order to identify the influence of the interlocking, we add the 
interlocking variables to the independent variables of Yabushita and Inoue [1993].   
The model to be estimated by Probit analysis is, 
 
P(C) =â1(CAPDEP)+â2(LOANDEP) +â3(RESDEP) +â4(ROE) +â5(FORM) 
+â6(SCALE)+â7(INTERLOCK) + â8(SCALE×INTERLOCK) 
+â9(STAKE)+â10 (ZAIBATSU)        (1)  
 
P(C) expresses the probability of bank closure.  In estimating the model (1), following 
Yabushita and Inoue [1993], we use a latent variable CL, which equals 1 if the bank closed in 
1927, and 0 otherwise. 
The definitions of independent variables are shown in Table 10.  We use the dummy 
variable "FORM" as Yabushita and Inoue[1993].  While most of the ordinary banks were 
joint-stock companies, our 1182 samples have 30 partnership companies.  To discriminate 
them, the model (1) includes "FORM". “SCALE” is the sum of deposit and own-capital. 
While Yabusita and Inoue[1993] used the dummy  variable, which could discriminate 
between medium-scale banks and other banks, we use “SCALE” as the continuous variable. 
The new variables we add are INTERLOCK, STAKE, ZAIBATSU and REGION.  
INTERROCK represents for 50 types of variables, namely INSIDER, DINSIDER, TOP, 
DTOP, EXECUTIVE, DEXECUTIVE etc., indicating the interlocking between each bank and 
non -banking companies as shown in Table 9.   The variable STAKE indicates the number 
of shareholders normalized by the paid-in capital.  On the other hand, there are 11 banks 
affiliated to major zaibatsu (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda).  Okazaki [1999] and 
[2001] pointed  out that the companies affiliated to zaibatsu outperformed other companies 
in terms of profitability.  To control the zaibatsu effect, we use the d ummy variable 
"ZAIBATSU." 
Results of the Probit analysis are reported in Table 10.  The estimated coefficients of 
CAPDEP and PROCAP are negative and statistically significant at 1% level in all equations.  
This is consistent with results of Yabushita and Inoue[1993].  We can reconfirm that both 
solvency and profitability affected on the probability of the bank closure. 
In Estimation-1, Estimation-2 and Estimation-3, the estimated coefficients of INTERLOCK are not significant.  However, in Estimation-4, the estimated coefficient of 
DORDINARY is positive and statistically significant at 10% level.  This indicates that the 
probability of bank closure was higher, if an ordinary director of the bank had the position 
of directors or auditors of the non-banking companies. 
And the estimated coefficients of the intersection term (SCALE×DORDINARY) is 
negative and statistically significant at 10%, while that of SCALE is not significant. This 
indicates DORDINARY had substitutive relation with SCALE.  Even if some ordinary 
directors have positions of  directors or auditors of the non-banking companies, the 
probability of closure would be lower when scale of the bank was large. 
The Probit analyses in this section have two problems.  One is the problem of 
disproportionate sampling (see Maddala[1992],pp.330-331).  As explained above, we 
excluded 220 samples out of 1420 samples in Ministry of Finance [1928].  Banks, which 
closed in 1927 and other banks, would be sampled at different rates in our Probit analysis.   
To avoid this problem we tried Logit analyses, but we couldn’t estimate coefficients of the 
Logit model. Because the log-likelihood function is decreasing, the maximum value of the 
log-likelihood function  couldn’t be computed.  Another problem is that, some banks might 
be able to avoid the bankruptcy because of moratorium in 1927.  In the Probit analyses, CL 
of such a banks will be zero. In this sense, CL does not directly indicate the quality of bank 
management.    
In order to explore relation between interlocking and bank performance more in detail, 
we next regress each bank’s financial indices on its governance variables.  The model for 
estimation is expressed as the follow. 
 
The performance= constant +ã1(INTERLOCK) +ã2 (CROSS) +ã3 (FORM) 
 + ã4 (SCALE) +ã5 (STAKE) +ã6 (ZAIBATSU)         (2) 
 
The dependent variables are four: CAPDEP, RESDEP, LOANDEP and ROE (=profit/equity).  
Since there are 50 types of "INTERLOCK", the  model (2)  can be expressed in 200 ways in all.  
While we computed all equations, here, we focus on the signs and statistical significance of 
the estimated coefficients of INTERLOCK.   
The results are summarized in the eight matrices (5×5) in Table 11, and the complete 
results are reported in the Appendix2.  The elements of the matrices are the estimated 
coefficients of INTERLOCK.  Matrix-1 and Matrix-2 shows the results of regressing 
CAPDEP on the independent variables explained above.  While in Matrix-1 INTEROCK is 
a continuous variable, in Matrix-2 INTEROCK is a dummy variable.  Matrix-3 and Matrix-4 
shows the results of regressing LOANDEP on the independent variables.  In Matrix-5 and in Matrix-6, the dependent variable is RESDEP.  And in Matrix-7 and in Matrix-8, the 
dependent variable is ROE.   
In Matrix-1, the coefficients of INTEROCK are negative and statistically significant in 
18  cases .  Also in Matrix-2, the coefficients INTEROCK are negative and statistically 
significant in 18 cases.  These results indicate that the balance sheet condition of those 
banks with interlocking were relatively risky for the depositors. 
In Matrix-3 there is no case in which the coefficient of INTERLOCK of which is 
statistically significant.  And in Matrix-4, some of the interlocking variables are negative 
and statistically significant, which means over-loan was less serious than others.  In other 
words, in terms of over loan, we cannot confirm the organ bank hypothesis. 
Matrix-5 and Matrix-6 show the results consistent  to Matrix-1 and Matrix-2.  Some 
coefficients are negative and statistically significant.  Especially in case auditors of a bank 
served directors of non-banking companies, liquidity of the bank was relatively low. 
Matrix-7 and -8 show relation between banks’ profitability and interlocking.  In these 
equations, we use the Tobit model, because some observations of profit (those banks whose 
profit were negative) are censored in Ministry of Finance [1928].  While the coefficients of 
DAUDITOR3 and DAUDITOR are positive and statistically significant, in other significant 
cases, the coefficients are negative.  These results indicate that interlocking reduced the 
banks’ profitability. 
So far, we have confirmed relatively  instable financial conditions of the banks with 
interlocking.   If so, why did depositors  deposit money to those  banks ?  The natural 
conjecture is that the interest rates of deposits were higher for those banks.  To check this 
conjecture, we regress interest rates of deposits on the interlocking variables.  The source of 
the interest rate data is Toyo Keizai Shinposha [1928].  This book contains the financial data 
of 126 banks, and concerning 115 of them, the profit and loss accounts are available.  We 
use the samples of 114 banks, the common set of these 115 banks and our 1182 samples 
explained above.  Although it is difficult to avoid the issue of sample selection bias, we 
conceder this is the best solution, taking into account of data availability.    
.    The results of the regressions are reported in Table 12.  In the equations with the 
interest rates of deposits as a dependent variable, the coefficients of TOP, ORDINARY and 
INSIDER are positive and statistically significant, which implies that depositors in the 
financial market evaluate the deposits of the banks with interlocking relatively risky.  On 
the other hand, in the equations with the interest rates of loans as a dependent variable, the 
coefficients of interlocking variables are not statistically significant.   
While the banks with interlocking should pay risk premium to the depositors to gather 
deposits, they could not earn higher interest rates from loans.  In other words, the profit margins of those banks were relatively small.  This result is consistent with the results 
reported in Matrix-7 and Matrix-8 of Table 11.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
     More than forty years ago, Kato[1957] posed the organ bank hypothesis, which has 
been one of the most basic hypotheses on the financial history of prewar Japan.  In this 
paper, we tested the organ bank hypothesis using quantitative data and econometrical 
methodology.   
First, we compiled a comprehensive database of company directors and auditors, 
based on Zenkoku Shogaisha Yakuinroku 1926 issue(Shogyo Koshinjo[1926]), and using the 
database we identified the interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and 
non -banking companies.   Interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and 
non -banking companies  was very pervasive.  Nearly 90% of ordinary banks had more than 
one directors or auditors who were at the same time directors or auditors of non-banking 
companies, and average number of interlocking per bank was as large as 7.85.  Observing 
by banks scale, we found that interlocking was more pervasive in the large-sized banks.         
     Second, using the interlocking variables, we examine the influence of interlocking on 
bank performance.  Through regression analyses we found that interlocking tended to give 
negative effect on the liquidity performance and profitability of banks, and increased the 
probability of bank closures in 1927.  Also, the interest rates of the deposits of those banks 
with interlocking were relatively high, while the interest rate of loans were not, and 
consequently profit margins of those banks were relatively small.  It implies  that the banks 
with interlocking should offer relatively high interest rate to gather deposits, because of the 
low evaluation of the financial market. 
     Those findings support the organ bank hypothesis.  In prewar Japan, banks’ business 
practices based on connection of the  directors and auditors made the banking system 
unsound, and eventually caused the Showa Financial Crisis in 1927.  In this sense, as we 
mentioned in section 1, the Showa Financial Crisis was a predecessor of the Asian Crisis in 
1997.   On the other hand, in 2001, the Bank Law will be revised to legalize the entry into the 
banking  industry from the other industries in Japan.  We should carefully examine its 
implication to the financial system, learning from the prewar experiences.    
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Appendix 1: Analysis of Dai-Shisanka Meibo 
In section 4, we pointed out the banks more than one of whose directors or auditors 
had the post of directors or auditors, were as many as 87.3 % of the total observations.  We 
can check this result by comparing it with the data based on Shibuya et al.[1982].  Shibuya 
et al.[1983] carries the data of large asset holders whose assets were over 500 thousand yen.  
Since the data include names, addresses, occupation and positions in companies of the large 
asset holders in 1917, we can calculate how many bank managers with large assets had the 
post of directors or auditors of non-banking companies. 
The result is shown in Table A.  The percentage is 58.8 (lower than 87.3% inTable 7).  
If we assume these percentages were stable before 1927, even the bank managers, whose 
assets were not over 500 thousand yen, also had t he post of directors or auditors of 
non -banking companies.  This implies that interlocking of bank managers was pervasive 
across their asset levels. 
 
Appendix 2: Results of estimating the model (2) in Section 5 
In Table B, the dependent variable is CAPDEP.  The estimated coefficients of intersection term are positive and statistically significant in some cases.  This indicates 
relation between INTERLOCK and SCALE was complementary in terms of the effect to 
solvency.   As compared to results of estimating the model (1) or analysis by Yabushita 
and Inoue[1993], the estimated coefficients of FORM are positive and statistically significant.  
Solvency of was higher when the bank was a joint-stock company than otherwise .   
In Table C, the dependent variable is LOANDEP.  Most of estimated coefficients are 
not significant.  In Table D, the dependent variable is RESDEP.  The estimated coefficients 
of the intersection term are positive and statistically significant in some cases.  However, 
the estimated coefficients of FORM are not significant in all cases.   What is remarkable is 
that the estimated coefficients of STAKE are negative and statistically  significant.  This 
indicates that the liquidity performance was better, if the number of shareholders 
normalized by the paid-in capital was larger. 
In Table E, the dependent variable is ROE.  There is no case that the estimated 
coefficient of INTERLOCK or that of cross term are significant.  On the other hand, the 
estimated coefficients of FORM are negative and statistically significant in most of the cases.  
Contrary to the results concerning solvency in Table B, those banks with the form of 
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Figure3 Share of top five banks in deposits %Source: Teranishi and Yokoyama [1998]



































































































1 1402 Rank of the  scale
Logarithm values of
 (Capital + Deposit)table1
Table1 Decomposition of decrease of the number of ordinary banks
1901-1910 1911-1920 1921-1930 1931-1936
Net increase -236 -292 -544 -358
Establishment 181 174 137 37
Convert from other form 31 29 545 0
Close, dissolusion and bankruptcy -283 -124 -360 -216
Merger and acquisition -44 -121 -864 -179
Convert to other form -121 -250 -2 0
Source: Goto[1970].table2
Table 2 List of the banks closed in 1927
Name Prefecture Deposits 
outstandings at 




Jugo Tokyo 368,434 3.596
Omi Osaka 137,135 1.338
Taiwan Taiwan 92,807 0.906
Murai Tokyo 60,059 0.586
Nakai Tokyo 45,551 0.445
Tokyo Watanabe Tokyo 37,005 0.361
Dai Rokujugo Hyogo 28,172 0.275
Souda Kanagawa 21,753 0.212
Hachijuyon Tokyo 17,798 0.174
Imabari Shogyo Ehime 13,684 0.134
Fukushima Shogyo Fukushima 8,724 0.085
Nakazawa Tokyo 8,686 0.085
Tokushima Tokushima 7,705 0.075
Taisho Tokyo 7,602 0.074
Awata Shiga 6,239 0.061
Kagoshima Kinken Kagoshima 6,050 0.059
Kurate Fukuoka 5,842 0.057
Akaji Chochiku Tokyo 5,349 0.052
Tango Shoko Kyoto 5,243 0.051
Hirobe Tokyo 4,757 0.046
Asanuma Gifu 4,598 0.045
Hiroshima Sangyo Hiroshima 4,366 0.043
Nishiebara Okayama 2,695 0.026
Noto Sangyo Ishikawa 2,665 0.026
Fukaya Shogyo Saitama 2,333 0.023
Tokushima Chochiku Tokushima 2,007 0.020
Tokatsu Chiba 1,927 0.019
Gamou Shiga 1,658 0.016
Kuki Saitama 1,656 0.016
Kawaizumi Osaka 1,639 0.016
Senyo Osaka 1,513 0.015
Yamashiro Kyoto 1,379 0.013
Ashishina Hiroshima 1,230 0.012
Akashi Shoko Hyogo 1,040 0.010
Uozumi Hyogo 761 0.007
Wakasa Fukui 729 0.007
Tango Kyoritsu Kyoto 634 0.006
Takeda Waribiki Tokyo 585 0.006
Soeda Fukuoka 533 0.005
Kuwafune Kyoto 306 0.003
Tamashima Shogyo Okayama 299 0.003
Shikano Yamaguchi 260 0.003
Aichi Saga 250 0.002
Moji Fukuoka 148 0.001
Hojubana Saitama 128 0.001
Source: Bank of Japan [1969], pp.81-82; Bank Bureau of Ministry of Finance [1928]
Note: The denominator of the share is the total deposits of ordinary banks and savings banks.Table 3 The bank performance and scale
Descriptive statistics
capdep loandep resdep
N 1402 1402 1402
average 1.27 2.09 0.25
st.dev 9.13 10.13 4.08
median 0.40 1.21 0.03
max 188.56 310.45 141.07
min 0.01 0.10 0.00
skewness 18.1 23.5 31.0
excess kurtois 346.5 651.8 1035.3
Correlation matrix of variables
capdep loandep resdep scale
capdep 1.00
loandep 0.49 1.00
resdep 0.70 0.44 1.00
scale -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 1.00
OLS regression
Equation-1 dependent variable: capdep
the coefficient t-ratio p-value
scale -0.36 -3.28 0.00
constant 6.30 4.05 0.00
adj- R squares 0.01
Equation-2 dependent variable: loandep
the coefficient t-ratio p-value
scale -0.12 -1.02 0.31
constant 3.81 2.20 0.03
adj- R squares 0.00
Equation-3 dependent variable: resdep
the coefficient t-ratio p-value
scale -0.09 -1.89 0.06
constant 1.55 2.22 0.03
adj- R squares 0.00Table 4 Relation between closure and scale
LARGE
capdep loandep resdep bank closure in 1927
N 17 17 17 1
average 0.30 1.01 0.01 1÷17=
st.dev 0.29 0.60 0.01 5.9%
MEDIUM
capdep loandep resdep  bank closure in 1927
N 196 196 196 10
average 0.57 3.63 0.17 10÷196=
st.dev 1.30 23.14 1.64 5.1%
SMALL
capdep loandep resdep  bank closure in 1927
N 1189 1189 1189 30
average 1.40 1.85 0.26 30÷1189=
st.dev 9.89 5.70 4.38 2.5%
All observations
capdep loandep resdep  bank closure in 1927
N 1402 1402 1402 41
average 1.27 2.09 0.25 41÷1402=
st.dev 9.13 10.13 4.08 2.9%
note
LARGE :banks of which paid-in capital are over ten million yen.
MEDIUM :banks of which paid-in capital are from one million to ten million yen.
SMALL :banks of which paid-in capital are less than one million yen.table5
Table 5 Coverage of Zenkoku Shogaisha Yakuinroku
Categories of the companies Number of data
A. Zenkoku Shogaisha Yakuinroku, 1926 issue Total 15,060
Banks 1,427
Non-banking joint-stock companise 11,578
Non-banking companise of the other form 2,055
B. Kaisha Tokei Hyo, 1926 issue Total 36,068
Banks 1,506
Non-banking joint-stock companise 16,251
Non-banking companise of the other form 18,311
C. Coverage (A/B*100) Total 41.8
Banks 94.8
Non-banking joint-stock companise 71.2
Non-banking companise of the other form 11.2
Note: All the data are concerning the companies in today's territory of Japan.  As mentioned in the text,
     there are the data of 1498 companies in the other area in Zenkoku Shogaisha Yakuinroku. Table 6 Discriptive Statistics
All observations
N MEAN ST.DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM
CAPDEP 1191 1.13 8.25 0.02 188.56
RESDEP 1191 0.14 1.66 0 51.989
LOANDEP 1191 2.04 10.28 0.10 310.45
ROE 1191 0.15 0.95 0 1.1076
excluding 9 outliers
N MEAN ST.DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM
CAPDEP 1182 0.64 0.84 0.02 8.49
RESDEP 1182 0.07 0.12 0.00 1.86
LOANDEP 1182 1.57 3.04 0.10 83.80
ROE 1182 0.15 0.09 0.00 1.11table7
Table 7 Interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and non-banking companies
a. All directors and auditors of 1,182 banks 
Positions in the non-
banking companies
Number of banks with 
interlocking
Ratio to all 
observations
Number of cases 
of interlocking
Average per bank
Total 1,032 87.3 9,280 7.85
Top executives 550 46.5 1,323 1.12
Executive directors 194 16.4 260 0.22
Ordinary directors 940 79.5 5,225 4.42
Auditors 797 67.4 2,472 2.09
b. Top executives of 1,182 banks
Positions in the non-
banking companies
Number of banks with 
interlocking
Ratio to all 
observations
Number of cases 
of interlocking
Average per bank
Total 682 57.7 2,496 2.11
Top executives 188 15.9 306 0.26
Executive directors 66 5.6 76 0.06
Ordinary directors 536 45.3 1,337 1.13
Auditors 420 35.5 777 0.66
c. Executive directors of 1,182 banks
Positions in the non-
banking companies
Number of banks with 
interlocking
Ratio to all 
observations
Number of cases 
of interlocking
Average per bank
Total 257 21.7 722 0.61
Top executives 52 4.4 67 0.06
Executive directors 30 2.5 34 0.03
Ordinary directors 183 15.5 387 0.33
Auditors 140 11.8 234 0.20
d. Ordinary directors of 1,182 banks
Positions in the non-
banking companies
Number of banks with 
interlocking
Ratio to all 
observations
Number of cases 
of interlocking
Average per bank
Total 858 72.6 4,499 3.81
Top executives 347 29.4 634 0.54
Executive directors 93 7.9 114 0.10
Ordinary directors 738 62.4 2,635 2.23
Auditors 528 44.7 1,116 0.94
e. Auditors of 1,182 banks
Positions in the non-
banking companies
Number of banks with 
interlocking
Ratio to all 
observations
Number of cases 
of interlocking
Average per bank
Total 514 43.5 1562 1.32
Top executives 202 17.1 316 0.27
Executive directors 31 2.6 36 0.03
Ordinary directors 377 31.9 865 0.73
Auditors 224 19.0 345 0.29table8
Table 8 Interlocking of directors and auditors between banks and non-banking companies by scale of banks
Table 8 (1)
a. All directors and auditors of 1,182 banks 
Positions in the non-
banking companies




Number of banks 
with interlocking
Ratio to all 
observations(%)
Average per bank
Total Total 1,182 1,032 87.3 7.9
-1,000 thousand yen 976 834 85.5 5.7
1,000-10,000 189 181 95.8 16.6
10,000- 17 17 100.0 34.5
Top executives Total 1,182 682 57.7 2.1
-1,000 thousand yen 976 515 52.8 1.5
1,000-10,000 189 151 79.9 4.4
10,000- 17 16 94.1 11.2
Executive directors Total 1,182 257 21.7 0.6
-1,000 thousand yen 976 160 16.4 0.4
1,000-10,000 189 85 45.0 1.6
10,000- 17 12 70.6 2.5
Ordinary directors Total 1,182 858 72.6 3.8
-1,000 thousand yen 976 677 69.4 2.8
1,000-10,000 189 164 86.8 7.8
10,000- 17 17 100.0 15.7
Auditors Total 1,182 514 43.5 1.3
-1,000 thousand yen 976 381 39.0 1.0
1,000-10,000 189 118 62.4 2.7
10,000- 17 15 88.2 5.1
b. Top executives of 1,182 banks
Positions in the non-
banking companies




Number of banks 
with interlocking
Ratio to all 
observations(%)
Average per bank
Total Total 1,182 682 57.7 17.1
-1,000 thousand yen 976 515 52.8 1.5
1,000-10,000 189 151 79.9 4.4
10,000- 17 16 94.1 11.2
Top executives Total 1,182 188 15.9 2.5
-1,000 thousand yen 976 104 10.7 0.2
1,000-10,000 189 73 38.6 0.6
10,000- 17 11 64.7 1.7
Executive directors Total 1,182 66 5.6 0.6
-1,000 thousand yen 976 40 4.1 0.0
1,000-10,000 189 22 11.6 0.1
10,000- 17 4 23.5 0.5
Ordinary directors Total 1,182 536 45.3 8.6
-1,000 thousand yen 976 390 40.0 0.8
1,000-10,000 189 131 69.3 2.4
10,000- 17 15 88.2 5.4
Auditors Total 1,182 420 35.5 5.4
-1,000 thousand yen 976 293 30.0 0.5
1,000-10,000 189 116 61.4 1.3
10,000- 17 11 64.7 3.6
c. Executive directors of 1,182 banks
Positions in the non-
banking companies




Number of banks 
with interlocking
Ratio to all 
observations(%)
Average per bank
Total Total 1,182 257 21.7 4.5
-1,000 thousand yen 976 160 16.4 0.4
1,000-10,000 189 85 45.0 1.6
10,000- 17 12 70.6 2.5
Top executives Total 1,182 52 4.4 0.2
-1,000 thousand yen 976 36 3.7 0.0
1,000-10,000 189 15 7.9 0.1
10,000- 17 1 5.9 0.1
Executive directors Total 1,182 30 2.5 0.1
-1,000 thousand yen 976 17 1.7 0.0
1,000-10,000 189 13 6.9 0.1
10,000- 17 0 0.0 0.0
Ordinary directors Total 1,182 183 15.5 2.5
-1,000 thousand yen 976 111 11.4 0.2
1,000-10,000 189 63 33.3 0.9
10,000- 17 9 52.9 1.4
Auditors Total 1,182 140 11.8 1.7
-1,000 thousand yen 976 76 7.8 0.1
1,000-10,000 189 55 29.1 0.6
10,000- 17 9 52.9 1.1table8
Table 8 (2)
d. Ordinary directors of 1,182 banks
Positions in the non-
banking companies




Number of banks 
with interlocking
Ratio to all 
observations(%)
Average per bank
Total Total 1,182 858 72.6 26.3
-1,000 thousand yen 976 677 69.4 2.8
1,000-10,000 189 164 86.8 7.8
10,000- 17 17 100.0 15.7
Top executives Total 1,182 347 29.4 4.5
-1,000 thousand yen 976 228 23.4 0.4
1,000-10,000 189 105 55.6 1.2
10,000- 17 14 82.4 2.9
Executive directors Total 1,182 93 7.9 0.6
-1,000 thousand yen 976 57 5.8 0.1
1,000-10,000 189 32 16.9 0.2
10,000- 17 4 23.5 0.4
Ordinary directors Total 1,182 738 62.4 14.7
-1,000 thousand yen 976 563 57.7 1.7
1,000-10,000 189 158 83.6 4.5
10,000- 17 17 100.0 8.5
Auditors Total 1,182 528 44.7 6.5
-1,000 thousand yen 976 387 39.7 0.7
1,000-10,000 189 124 65.6 1.9
10,000- 17 17 100.0 3.9
e. Auditors of 1,182 banks
Positions in the non-
banking companies




Number of banks 
with interlocking
Ratio to all 
observations(%)
Average per bank
Total Total 1,182 514 43.5 8.8
-1,000 thousand yen 976 381 39.0 1.0
1,000-10,000 189 118 62.4 2.7
10,000- 17 15 88.2 5.1
Top executives Total 1,182 202 17.1 1.9
-1,000 thousand yen 976 132 13.5 0.2
1,000-10,000 189 59 31.2 0.6
10,000- 17 11 64.7 1.2
Executive directors Total 1,182 31 2.6 0.2
-1,000 thousand yen 976 22 2.3 0.0
1,000-10,000 189 7 3.7 0.0
10,000- 17 2 11.8 0.1
Ordinary directors Total 1,182 377 31.9 4.4
-1,000 thousand yen 976 273 28.0 0.6
1,000-10,000 189 92 48.7 1.5
10,000- 17 12 70.6 2.4
Auditors Total 1,182 224 19.0 2.2
-1,000 thousand yen 976 151 15.5 0.2
1,000-10,000 189 64 33.9 0.6
10,000- 17 9 52.9 1.4Table 9 The difinitions of Variables
CAPDEP = own-capital/deposit FORM = 1 if the bank is stock company, otherwise 0.
LOANDEP = loan/deposit SCALE = own-capital+deposit
RESDEP = reserve/deposit STAKE = Shareholders/own-capital
ROE = profit/own-capital ZAIBATSU = 1 if the bank affiliated to zaibatsu , otherwise 0.
INTERLOCK(Continuous variables) INTERLOCK(Dummy variables)
TOP1 : How many companies the top manager of the bank would be the top of non-bank companies. DTOP1 =1 if TOP1>0, otherwise 0.
TOP2 : How many companies the top manager of the bank would be the second manager of non-bank companies. DTOP2 =1 if TOP2>0, otherwise 0.
TOP3 : How many companies the top manager of the bank would be the officer of non-bank companies. DTOP3 =1 if TOP3>0, otherwise 0.
TOP4 : How many companies the top manager of the bank would be the auditor of non-bank companies. DTOP4 =1 if TOP4>0, otherwise 0.
TOP : =TOP1+TOP2+TOP3+TOP4 DTOP5 =1 if TOP>0, otherwise 0.
EXECUTIVE1 : How many companies the second manager of the bank would be the top of non-bank companies. DEXECUTIVE1 =1 if SECOND1>0, otherwise 0.
EXECUTIVE2 : How many companies the second manager of the bank would be the second manager of non-bank companies. DEXECUTIVE2 =1 if SECOND2>0, otherwise 0.
EXECUTIVE3 : How many companies the second manager of the bank would be the officer of non-bank companies. DEXECUTIVE3 =1 if SECOND3>0, otherwise 0.
EXECUTIVE4 : How many companies the second manager of the bank would be the auditor of non-bank companies. DEXECUTIVE4 =1 if SECOND4>0, otherwise 0.
EXECUTIVE : =SECOND1+SECOND2+SECOND3+SECOND4 DEXECUTIVE =1 if SECOND>0, otherwise 0.
ORDINARY1 : How many companies the officer of the bank would be the top of non-bank companies.DORDINARY1 =1 if OFFICER1>0, otherwise 0.
ORDINARY2 : How many companies the officer of the bank would be the second manager of non-bank companies. DORDINARY2 =1 if OFFICER2>0, otherwise 0.
ORDINARY3 : How many companies the officer of the bank would be the officer of non-bank companies. DORDINARY3 =1 if OFFICER3>0, otherwise 0.
ORDINARY4 : How many companies the officer of the bank would be the auditor of non-bank companies. DORDINARY4 =1 if OFFICER4>0, otherwise 0.
ORDINARY : =OFFICER1+OFFICER2+OFFICER3+OFFICER4 DORDINARY =1 if OFFICER>0, otherwise 0.
AUDITOR1 : How many companies the auditor of the bank would be the top of non-bank companies. DAUDITOR1 =1 if AUDITOR1>0, otherwise 0.
AUDITOR2 : How many companies the auditor of the bank would be the second manager of non-bank companies. DAUDITOR2 =1 if AUDITOR2>0, otherwise 0.
AUDITOR3 : How many companies the auditor of the bank would be the officer of non-bank companies. DAUDITOR3 =1 if AUDITOR3>0, otherwise 0.
AUDITOR4 : How many companies the auditor of the bank would be the auditor of non-bank companies. DAUDITOR4 =1 if AUDITOR4>0, otherwise 0.
AUDITOR5 : =AUDITOR1+AUDITOR2+AUDITOR3+AUDITOR4 DAUDITOR5 =1 if AUDITOR>0, otherwise 0.
INSIDER1 : =TOP1+SECOND1+OFFICER1+AUDITOR1 DINSIDER1 =1 if INSIDER1>0, otherwise 0.
INSIDER2 : =TOP2+SECOND2+OFFICER2+AUDITOR2 DINSIDER2 =1 if INSIDER2>0, otherwise 0.
INSIDER3 : =TOP3+SECOND3+OFFICER3+AUDITOR3 DINSIDER3 =1 if INSIDER3>0, otherwise 0.
INSIDER4 : =TOP4+SECOND4+OFFICER4+AUDITOR4 DINSIDER4 =1 if INSIDER4>0, otherwise 0.
INSIDER5 : =INSIDER1+INSIDER2+INSIDER3+INSIDER4 DINSIDER5 =1 if INSIDER>0, otherwise 0.Table 10 Results of Probit Model Estimation
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CLS
observations at one 38
observations at zero 1144
total observations 1182
Estimation-retesting Yabushita and Inoue[1992] Estimation-1 Estimation-2
variables The estimated Coefficient t-ratio The estimated Coefficient t-ratio The estimated Coefficient t-ratio
CAPDEP -0.89 -3.22 *** -0.87 -3.06 *** -0.85 -3.03 ***
LOANDEP 0.03 1.27   0.04 1.28   0.03 1.25  
RESDEP -0.54 -0.67   -0.49 -0.60   -0.50 -0.62  
PROCAP -4.37 -3.45 *** -4.61 -3.49 *** -4.46 -3.35 ***
FORM 4.53 0.01   2.11 0.63   2.05 0.61  
SCALE 0.00 1.19   0.00 -0.23   0.00 1.37  
INSIDER   0.00 0.49    
INSIDER*SCALE   0.00 0.94    
DINSIDER     0.20 0.66  
DINSIDER*SCALE     0.00 -1.24  
STAKE   63.43 -0.63   -52.89 -0.54  
ZAIBATSU   5.80 -1.26   -3.19 -0.79  
constant -5.42 -0.01   -2.97 -0.89   -3.10 -0.92  
Log-likelihood Function -153.2 -150.2 -150.3
Maddala R-squares  0.02 0.03 0.03
Estimation-3 Estimation-4
variables The estimated Coefficient t-ratio The estimated Coefficient t-ratio
CAPDEP -0.91 -3.16 *** -0.86 -2.99 ***
LOANDEP 0.04 1.33   0.04 1.49  
RESDEP -0.53 -0.66   -0.56 -0.69  
PROCAP -5.23 -3.80 *** -4.85 -3.43 ***
FORM 2.10 0.65   1.83 0.57  
SCALE 0.00 -0.27   0.00 1.49  
TOP 0.03 0.89    
EXECUTIVE 0.06 1.20    
ORDINARY 0.01 0.37    
AUDITOR -0.05 -1.17    
TOP*SCALE 0.00 1.31    
EXECUTIVE*SCALE 0.00 0.14    
ORDINARY*SCALE 0.00 -1.30    
AUDITOR*SCALE 0.00 0.88    
DTOP   0.07 0.33  
DEXECUTIVE   0.08 0.40  
DORDINARY 0.51 1.89 *
DAUDITOR -0.18 -1.03  
DTOP*SCALE 0.00 0.70  
DEXECUTIVE*SCALE 0.00 -0.49  
DORDINARY*SCALE 0.00 -1.72 *
DAUDITOR*SCALE 0.00 0.06  
STAKE -79.01 -0.76 -57.31 -0.57  
ZAIBATSU -3.56 -0.56 -3.61 -0.83  
constant -2.87 -0.88 -3.06 -0.95  
Log-likelihood Function -145.0 -147.03
Maddala R-squares  0.04 0.03Table 11 Result of Regression of the model (2)
Matrix-1 Matrix-2
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
TOP -0.026 0.102 -0.023 * -0.037 * -0.014 * DTOP -0.157 ** 0.117 -0.096 * -0.073 -0.057
EXECUTIVE -0.180 * -0.114 -0.076 *** -0.108 *** -0.050 *** DEXECUTIVE -0.218 * -0.157 -0.213 *** -0.192 ** -0.225 ***
ORDINARY -0.030 -0.053 -0.022 *** -0.038 ** -0.013 *** DORDINARY -0.157 *** -0.082 -0.181 *** -0.148 *** -0.191 ***
AUDITOR -0.126 *** -0.170 -0.064 *** -0.102 *** -0.047 *** DAUDITOR -0.271 *** -0.161 -0.209 *** -0.217 *** -0.276 ***
INSIDER -0.036 *** -0.039 -0.017 *** -0.034 *** -0.010 *** DINSIDER -0.297 *** 0.045 -0.215 *** -0.154 *** -0.259 ***
Matrix-3 Matrix-4
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
TOP 0.033 0.088 -0.031 0.106 0.006 DTOP 0.253 0.093 -0.058 0.054 -0.020
EXECUTIVE -0.314 -0.131 -0.112 -0.158 -0.073 DEXECUTIVE -0.425 -0.200 -0.378 -0.303 -0.383
ORDINARY -0.113 -0.109 -0.045 -0.111 -0.033 DORDINARY -0.307 -0.109 -0.367 * -0.346 * -0.457 **
AUDITOR -0.168 -0.295 -0.042 -0.034 -0.036 DAUDITOR -0.335 -0.346 -0.067 -0.214 -0.176
INSIDER -0.068 -0.084 -0.027 -0.029 -0.015 DINSIDER -0.205 -0.141 -0.053 -0.208 -0.072
Matrix-5 Matrix-6
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
TOP 0.005 0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.000 DTOP -0.006 0.004 0.005 -0.011 -0.005
EXECUTIVE 0.001 0.025 -0.002 -0.009 -0.002 DEXECUTIVE 0.008 0.044 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006
ORDINARY 0.002 -0.013 -0.002 ** -0.005 * -0.001 * DORDINARY -0.004 -0.022 -0.011 -0.014 * -0.009
AUDITOR -0.001 -0.018 -0.007 *** -0.005 -0.003 ** DAUDITOR -0.003 -0.024 -0.021 *** -0.015 -0.011
INSIDER 0.002 -0.005 -0.002 ** -0.003 * -0.001 * DINSIDER 0.001 -0.007 -0.006 -0.016 ** -0.008
Matrix-7 Matrix-8
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
TOP -0.002 -0.018 * -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 DTOP 0.000 -0.021 -0.002 -0.005 -0.007
EXECUTIVE 0.006 -0.012 -0.001 0.003 0.000 DEXECUTIVE -0.003 -0.018 -0.009 0.003 -0.004
ORDINARY -0.003 -0.020 ** -0.002 *** -0.003 -0.002 *** DORDINARY -0.008 -0.021 * -0.013 ** -0.010 -0.015 **
AUDITOR 0.000 0.013 0.002 0.001 0.001 DAUDITOR 0.006 0.003 0.012 * 0.005 0.014 **
INSIDER -0.001 -0.011 * -0.001 -0.001 0.000 DINSIDER 0.002 -0.016 * -0.012 -0.012 * -0.005
note 1) Elements of each matrices are the estimmated coefficients of Interlocking variables.
ex. in Matrix-A, the estimated coefficient of EXECUTIVE1 is -0.180.
in Matrix-B, the estimated coefficient of DINSIDER is -0.259.
note 2) *** :significant at 1% level.
** :significant at 5% level.
* :significant at 10% level.Table 12 Risk-premium on the deposit of the banks with interlocking
Dependent Variable: deposit rate
Estimation-1 loan rate= â1(Interlocking variables) +â2(loan)+constant
variables the estimated  t-value the estimated  t-value the estimated  t-value the estimated  t-value the estimated  t-value
TOP   2.63E-04 0.99        
SECOND     -3.07E-04 -0.68      
OFFICER       1.98E-04 1.24    
AUDITOUR         2.15E-04 0.84  
INSIDER 1.15E-04 1.24          
loan -6.05E-11 -3.82 *** -6.14E-11 -3.67 *** -5.32E-11 -3.52 *** -5.79E-11 -3.79 *** -5.53E-11 -3.66 ***
constant 6.22E-02 26.55 *** 6.32E-02 31.97 *** 6.48E-02 36.8 *** 6.25E-02 28.56 *** 6.36E-02 34.87 ***
adj-R squares 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09
Estimation-2 deposit rate= â3(Interlocking variables) +â4(deposit)+constant
variables the estimated  t-value the estimated  t-value the estimated  t-value the estimated  t-value the estimated  t-value
TOP   3.52E-04 1.82 *      
SECOND     3.97E-05 0.12      
OFFICER       2.54E-04 2.20 **  
AUDITOUR         2.66E-04 1.42  
INSIDER 1.67E-04 2.49 **        
deposits -4.59E-11 -4.60 *** -4.62E-11 -4.36 *** -3.80E-11 -3.90 *** -4.20E-11 -4.33 *** -3.94E-11 -4.06 ***
constant 4.55E-02 26.89 *** 4.71E-02 32.64 *** 4.85E-02 37.43 *** 4.62E-02 29.07 *** 4.77E-02 35.91 ***
adj-R squares 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.12Appendix A
Table A
Dai-Shisanka Bank maneger(1) Interlocking(2) (2)/(1) (%)
The Number 2130 648 381 58.8%
(%) (100%) (30.4%) (17.9%)Appendix B
Table B
CAPDEP=  ã1(INTERLOCK) +ã2 (CROSS) +ã3 (FORM)
 +ã4 (SCALE) +ã5 (STAKE) +ã6 (ZAIBATSU) +constat
INTERLOCK ã1 ã2 ã3 ã4 ã5 ã6 constant adj R-squares
TOP1 -0.026 0.000 * 0.345 ** -14.981 0.000 *** -0.179 0.344 ** 0.01
TOP2 0.102 0.000 0.326 ** -9.645 0.000 *** -0.162 0.342 ** 0.01
TOP3 -0.023 * 0.000 ** 0.366 ** -17.766 0.000 *** -0.231 0.345 ** 0.01
TOP4 -0.037 * 0.000 0.359 ** -15.000 0.000 *** -0.160 0.343 ** 0.01
TOP -0.014 * 0.000 *** 0.370 ** -19.383 0.000 *** -0.267 0.346 ** 0.01
EXECUTIVE1 -0.180 * 0.000 0.331 ** -13.146 0.000 *** -0.133 0.354 ** 0.01
EXECUTIVE2 -0.114 0.000 0.339 ** -12.758 0.000 *** -0.128 0.342 ** 0.01
EXECUTIVE3 -0.076 *** 0.000 ** 0.359 ** -16.961 0.000 *** 0.144 0.347 ** 0.02
EXECUTIVE4 -0.108 *** 0.000 0.355 ** 15.323 0.000 *** -0.165 0.343 ** 0.01
EXECUTIVE -0.050 *** 0.000 ** 0.361 ** 17.721 0.000 *** -0.159 0.349 ** 0.02
ORDINARY1 -0.030 0.000 * 0.353 ** -15.270 0.000 *** -0.196 0.344 ** 0.01
ORDINARY2 -0.053 0.000 0.338 ** -11.675 0.000 *** -0.121 0.342 ** 0.01
ORDINARY3 -0.022 *** 0.000 ** 0.383 ** -17.664 0.000 *** -0.246 0.348 ** 0.02
ORDINARY4 -0.038 ** 0.000 *** 0.375 ** -19.644 0.000 *** -0.315 0.350 ** 0.02
ORDINARY -0.013 *** 0.000 ** 0.388 *** -20.083 0.000 *** -0.291 0.349 ** 0.02
AUDITOR1 -0.126 *** 0.000 ** 0.349 ** -23.161 0.000 *** -0.272 0.369 ** 0.02
AUDITOR2 -0.170 0.000 0.339 ** -12.029 0.000 *** -0.150 0.342 ** 0.01
AUDITOR3 -0.064 *** 0.000 ** 0.353 ** -24.026 0.000 *** -0.126 0.379 *** 0.02
AUDITOR4 -0.102 *** 0.000 0.348 ** -18.324 0.000 *** -0.087 0.359 ** 0.01
AUDITOR -0.047 *** 0.000 *** 0.362 ** -28.767 0.000 *** -0.208 0.388 *** 0.02
INSIDER1 -0.036 *** 0.000 *** 0.374 ** -24.204 0.000 *** -0.262 0.355 ** 0.02
INSIDER2 -0.039 0.000 0.342 ** -12.285 0.000 *** -0.158 0.342 ** 0.01
INSIDER3 -0.017 *** 0.000 *** 0.408 *** -26.214 0.000 *** -0.272 0.359 ** 0.02
INSIDER4 -0.034 *** 0.000 *** 0.404 *** -24.667 0.000 *** -0.273 0.354 ** 0.02
INSIDER -0.010 *** 0.000 *** 0.416 *** -29.220 0.000 *** -0.336 0.360 ** 0.02
DTOP1 -0.157 ** 0.000 0.362 ** -17.450 0.000 *** -0.133 0.344 ** 0.01
DTOP2 0.117 0.000 0.325 ** -9.061 0.000 *** -0.145 0.342 ** 0.01
DTOP3 -0.096 * 0.000 0.378 ** -15.312 0.000 ** -0.095 0.345 ** 0.01
DTOP4 -0.073 0.000 * 0.362 ** -14.791 0.000 *** -0.226 0.347 ** 0.01
DTOP -0.057 0.000 * 0.365 ** -14.456 0.000 *** -0.174 0.350 ** 0.01
DEXECUTIVE1 -0.218 * 0.000 0.329 ** -13.143 0.000 *** -0.136 0.357 ** 0.01
DEXECUTIVE2 -0.157 0.000 0.340 ** -12.953 0.000 *** -0.128 0.342 ** 0.01
DEXECUTIVE3 -0.213 *** 0.000 ** 0.365 ** -18.108 0.000 *** -0.094 0.352 ** 0.02
DEXECUTIVE4 -0.192 ** 0.000 * 0.359 ** -15.409 0.000 *** -0.152 0.344 ** 0.01
DEXECUTIVE -0.225 *** 0.000 ** 0.365 ** -20.087 0.000 *** -0.066 0.368 ** 0.02
DORDINARY1 -0.157 *** 0.000 ** 0.383 ** -17.007 0.000 *** -0.216 0.347 ** 0.02
DORDINARY2 -0.082 0.000 0.339 ** -11.835 0.000 *** -0.126 0.342 ** 0.01
DORDINARY3 -0.181 *** 0.000 *** 0.422 *** -21.370 0.000 *** -0.165 0.401 *** 0.03
DORDINARY4 -0.148 *** 0.000 *** 0.400 *** -24.939 0.000 *** -0.144 0.390 *** 0.03
DORDINARY -0.191 *** 0.000 *** 0.428 *** -18.592 0.000 *** -0.154 0.416 *** 0.02
DAUDITOR1 -0.271 *** 0.000 *** 0.347 ** -25.309 0.000 *** -0.294 0.391 *** 0.02
DAUDITOR2 -0.161 0.000 0.337 ** -11.603 0.000 *** -0.149 0.342 ** 0.01
DAUDITOR3 -0.209 *** 0.000 0.331 ** -24.177 0.000 *** -0.067 0.421 * 0.02
DAUDITOR4 -0.217 *** 0.000 0.357 ** -19.823 0.000 ** -0.033 0.364 ** 0.02
DAUDITOR -0.276 *** 0.000 *** 0.342 ** -33.300 0.000 *** -0.181 0.475 *** 0.03
DINSIDER1 -0.297 *** 0.000 *** 0.413 *** -33.688 0.000 *** -0.155 0.452 *** 0.04
DINSIDER2 0.045 0.000 0.340 ** -11.942 0.000 *** -0.135 0.342 ** 0.01
DINSIDER3 -0.215 *** 0.000 *** 0.401 *** -19.169 0.000 *** -0.145 0.465 *** 0.02
DINSIDER4 -0.154 *** 0.000 *** 0.402 *** -20.854 0.000 *** -0.152 0.402 *** 0.02
DINSIDER -0.259 *** 0.000 *** 0.401 *** -17.017 0.000 *** -0.146 0.514 *** 0.02Appendix C
Table C
LOANDEP=  ã1(INTERLOCK) +ã2 (CROSS) +ã3 (FORM)
 +ã4 (SCALE) +ã5 (STAKE) +ã6 (ZAIBATSU) +constat
INTERLOCK ã1 ã2 ã3 ã4 ã5 ã6 constant adj R-squares
TOP1 0.033 0.000 0.425 -105.150 0.000 0.041 1.258 ** 0.00
TOP2 0.088 0.000 0.423 -104.240 0.000 0.068 1.256 ** 0.00
TOP3 -0.031 0.000 0.471 -113.880 0.000 -0.049 1.259 ** 0.00
TOP4 0.106 0.000 0.356 -93.718 0.000 0.138 1.256 ** 0.00
TOP 0.006 0.000 0.422 -105.910 0.000 -0.025 1.260 ** 0.00
EXECUTIVE1 -0.314 0.000 0.427 -109.570 0.000 0.053 1.277 ** 0.00
EXECUTIVE2 -0.131 0.000 0.437 -107.820 0.000 0.064 1.256 ** 0.00
EXECUTIVE3 -0.112 0.000 0.467 -114.140 0.000 0.042 1.263 ** 0.00
EXECUTIVE4 -0.158 0.000 0.462 -112.100 0.000 0.028 1.257 ** 0.00
EXECUTIVE -0.073 0.000 0.471 -115.530 0.000 0.022 1.266 ** 0.00
ORDINARY1 -0.113 0.000 0.497 -118.760 0.000 0.036 1.259 ** 0.00
ORDINARY2 -0.109 0.000 0.441 -107.490 0.000 0.067 1.256 ** 0.00
ORDINARY3 -0.045 0.000 0.530 -117.570 0.000 0.012 1.265 ** 0.00
ORDINARY4 -0.111 0.000 0.540 -123.880 0.000 -0.170 1.269 ** 0.00
ORDINARY -0.033 0.000 0.561 -124.440 0.000 -0.048 1.267 ** 0.00
AUDITOR1 -0.168 0.000 0.450 -121.500 0.000 -0.082 1.292 ** 0.00
AUDITOR2 -0.295 0.000 0.439 -107.440 0.000 0.044 1.256 ** 0.00
AUDITOR3 -0.042 0.000 0.442 -113.750 0.000 0.093 1.280 ** 0.00
AUDITOR4 -0.034 0.000 0.436 -108.520 0.000 0.131 1.262 ** 0.00
AUDITOR -0.036 0.000 0.451 -118.910 0.000 0.064 1.291 ** 0.00
INSIDER1 -0.068 0.000 0.501 -127.840 0.000 -0.076 1.278 ** 0.00
INSIDER2 -0.084 0.000 0.449 -108.930 0.000 0.068 1.256 ** 0.00
INSIDER3 -0.027 0.000 0.541 -126.820 0.000 -0.028 1.279 ** 0.00
INSIDER4 -0.029 0.000 0.489 -116.740 0.000 -0.036 1.266 ** 0.00
INSIDER -0.015 0.000 0.543 -129.280 0.000 -0.095 1.279 ** 0.00
DTOP1 0.253 0.000 0.384 -96.629 0.000 0.206 1.258 ** 0.00
DTOP2 0.093 0.000 0.423 -103.900 0.000 0.087 1.256 ** 0.00
DTOP3 -0.058 0.000 0.456 -108.300 0.000 0.119 1.260 ** 0.00
DTOP4 0.054 0.000 0.411 -106.210 0.000 -0.045 1.261 ** 0.00
DTOP -0.020 0.000 0.439 -107.680 0.000 0.025 1.264 ** 0.00
DEXECUTIVE1 -0.425 0.000 0.422 -109.950 0.000 0.049 1.285 ** 0.00
DEXECUTIVE2 -0.200 0.000 0.438 -108.130 0.000 0.063 1.256 ** 0.00
DEXECUTIVE3 -0.378 0.000 0.483 -116.950 0.000 0.091 1.272 ** 0.00
DEXECUTIVE4 -0.303 0.000 0.469 -112.000 0.000 0.067 1.258 ** 0.00
DEXECUTIVE -0.383 0.000 0.483 -120.210 0.000 0.135 1.298 ** 0.00
DORDINARY1 -0.307 0.000 0.525 -115.380 0.000 0.018 1.258 ** 0.00
DORDINARY2 -0.109 0.000 0.439 -106.840 0.000 0.074 1.256 ** 0.00
DORDINARY3 -0.367 * 0.000 0.643 -103.500 0.000 0.114 1.259 ** 0.00
DORDINARY4 -0.346 * 0.000 0.578 -115.900 0.000 0.076 1.280 ** 0.00
DORDINARY -0.457 ** 0.000 0.746 -95.793 0.000 0.112 1.242 ** 0.00
DAUDITOR1 -0.335 0.000 0.443 -122.300 0.000 -0.051 1.315 ** 0.00
DAUDITOR2 -0.346 0.000 0.439 -107.010 0.000 0.045 1.256 ** 0.00
DAUDITOR3 -0.067 0.000 0.428 -109.290 0.000 0.098 1.281 ** 0.00
DAUDITOR4 -0.214 0.000 0.456 -115.120 0.000 0.158 1.278 ** 0.00
DAUDITOR -0.176 0.000 0.432 -118.960 0.000 0.092 1.340 ** 0.00
DINSIDER1 -0.205 0.000 0.485 -122.360 0.000 0.046 1.345 ** 0.00
DINSIDER2 -0.141 0.000 0.455 -109.910 0.000 0.114 1.256 ** 0.00
DINSIDER3 -0.053 0.000 0.437 -108.630 0.000 0.063 1.304 ** 0.00
DINSIDER4 -0.208 0.000 0.528 -118.230 0.000 0.037 1.329 ** 0.00
DINSIDER -0.072 0.000 0.445 -107.570 0.000 0.068 1.311 ** 0.00Appendix D
Table D
RESDEP=  ã1(INTERLOCK) +ã2 (CROSS) +ã3 (FORM)
 +ã4 (SCALE) +ã5 (STAKE) +ã6 (ZAIBATSU) +constat
INTERLOCK ã1 ã2 ã3 ã4 ã5 ã6 constant adj R-squares
TOP1 0.005 0.000 0.004 -11.144 *** 0.000 -0.025 0.079 *** 0.01
TOP2 0.004 0.000 0.005 -11.271 *** 0.000 -0.027 0.079 *** 0.01
TOP3 0.000 0.000 0.006 -11.627 *** 0.000 -0.032 0.079 *** 0.01
TOP4 -0.001 0.000 0.006 -11.441 *** 0.000 ** -0.025 0.079 *** 0.01
TOP 0.000 0.000 0.005 -11.604 *** 0.000 ** -0.034 0.079 *** 0.01
EXECUTIVE1 0.001 0.000 0.005 -11.330 *** 0.000 ** -0.025 0.079 *** 0.01
EXECUTIVE2 0.025 0.000 0.005 -11.404 *** 0.000 ** -0.024 0.079 *** 0.01
EXECUTIVE3 -0.002 0.000 0.006 -11.530 *** 0.000 * 0.000 0.079 *** 0.01
EXECUTIVE4 -0.009 0.000 0.007 -11.688 *** 0.000 * -0.026 0.079 *** 0.01
EXECUTIVE -0.002 0.000 0.006 -11.577 *** 0.000 * -0.025 0.079 *** 0.01
ORDINARY1 0.002 0.000 0.004 -11.179 *** 0.000 ** -0.031 0.079 *** 0.01
ORDINARY2 -0.013 0.000 0.006 -11.599 *** 0.000 * -0.025 0.079 *** 0.01
ORDINARY3 -0.002 ** 0.000 0.010 -12.058 *** 0.000 ** -0.034 0.079 *** 0.01
ORDINARY4 -0.005 * 0.000 * 0.010 -12.276 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 0.080 *** 0.01
ORDINARY -0.001 * 0.000 0.010 -12.209 *** 0.000 ** -0.038 0.079 *** 0.01
AUDITOR1 -0.001 0.000 0.005 -11.417 *** 0.000 ** -0.029 0.079 *** 0.01
AUDITOR2 -0.018 0.000 0.006 -11.470 *** 0.000 ** -0.028 0.079 *** 0.01
AUDITOR3 -0.007 *** 0.000 0.007 -12.747 *** 0.000 ** -0.021 0.083 *** 0.01
AUDITOR4 -0.005 0.000 0.006 -11.721 *** 0.000 * -0.020 0.080 *** 0.01
AUDITOR -0.003 ** 0.000 0.007 -12.608 *** 0.000 ** -0.028 0.082 *** 0.01
INSIDER1 0.002 0.000 0.004 -11.073 *** 0.000 ** -0.033 0.079 *** 0.01
INSIDER2 -0.005 0.000 0.006 -11.555 *** 0.000 ** -0.027 0.079 *** 0.01
INSIDER3 -0.002 ** 0.000 0.011 -12.662 *** 0.000 ** -0.037 0.080 *** 0.01
INSIDER4 -0.003 * 0.000 0.010 -12.393 *** 0.000 * 0.000 -0.035 *** 0.01
INSIDER -0.001 * 0.000 0.011 -12.607 *** 0.000 ** -0.041 0.080 *** 0.01
DTOP1 -0.006 0.000 0.006 -11.585 *** 0.000 * -0.024 0.079 *** 0.01
DTOP2 0.004 0.000 0.005 -11.256 *** 0.000 ** -0.024 0.079 *** 0.01
DTOP3 0.005 0.000 0.002 -11.106 *** 0.000 -0.021 0.079 *** 0.01
DTOP4 -0.011 0.000 0.009 -11.851 *** 0.000 ** -0.036 0.079 *** 0.01
DTOP -0.005 0.000 0.007 -11.643 *** 0.000 * -0.029 0.080 *** 0.01
DEXECUTIVE1 0.008 0.000 0.005 -11.277 *** 0.000 ** -0.026 0.078 *** 0.01
DEXECUTIVE2 0.044 0.000 0.004 -11.289 *** 0.000 ** -0.024 0.079 *** 0.01
DEXECUTIVE3 -0.004 0.000 0.006 -11.532 *** 0.000 * -0.021 0.079 *** 0.01
DEXECUTIVE4 -0.002 0.000 0.005 -11.400 *** 0.000 * -0.026 0.079 *** 0.01
DEXECUTIVE -0.006 0.000 0.006 -11.570 *** 0.000 -0.021 0.079 *** 0.01
DORDINARY1 -0.004 0.000 0.006 -11.527 *** 0.000 -0.029 0.079 *** 0.01
DORDINARY2 -0.022 0.000 0.007 -11.667 *** 0.000 ** -0.026 0.079 *** 0.01
DORDINARY3 -0.011 0.000 0.011 -11.657 *** 0.000 -0.025 0.081 *** 0.01
DORDINARY4 -0.014 * 0.000 0.011 -12.056 *** 0.000 -0.024 0.081 *** 0.01
DORDINARY -0.009 0.000 0.010 -11.450 *** 0.000 -0.024 0.081 *** 0.01
DAUDITOR1 -0.003 0.000 0.005 -11.562 *** 0.000 ** -0.034 0.079 *** 0.01
DAUDITOR2 -0.024 0.000 0.006 -11.466 *** 0.000 ** -0.028 0.079 *** 0.01
DAUDITOR3 -0.021 *** 0.000 0.005 -12.664 *** 0.000 -0.018 0.087 *** 0.01
DAUDITOR4 -0.015 0.000 0.007 -12.020 *** 0.000 -0.018 0.080 *** 0.01
DAUDITOR -0.011 0.000 0.005 -12.265 *** 0.000 -0.028 0.084 *** 0.01
DINSIDER1 0.001 0.000 0.005 -11.403 *** 0.000 -0.024 0.080 *** 0.01
DINSIDER2 -0.007 0.000 0.006 -11.546 *** 0.000 * -0.025 0.079 *** 0.01
DINSIDER3 -0.006 0.000 0.007 -11.535 *** 0.000 -0.024 0.082 *** 0.01
DINSIDER4 -0.016 ** 0.000 0.013 -12.192 *** 0.000 -0.025 0.083 *** 0.01
DINSIDER -0.008 0.000 0.007 -11.538 *** 0.000 -0.024 0.084 *** 0.01Appendix E
Table E
PROCAP=  ã1(INTERLOCK) +ã2 (CROSS) +ã3 (FORM)
 +ã4 (SCALE) +ã5 (STAKE) +ã6 (ZAIBATSU) +constat
TOBIT ANALYSIS, LIMIT=    0.00
56 LIMIT OBSERVATIONS
1126 NON-LIMIT OBSERVATIONS
INTERLOCK ã1 ã2 ã3 ã4 ã5 ã6 constant LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION
TOP1 -0.002 0.000 -0.034 * -0.170 0.000 0.008 0.181 *** 947.4
TOP2 -0.018 * 0.000 -0.034 * -0.096 0.000 0.012 0.181 *** 948.7
TOP3 -0.001 0.000 -0.034 * -0.205 0.000 0.006 0.181 *** 947.5
TOP4 -0.003 0.000 -0.033 * -0.219 0.000 0.008 0.181 *** 947.7
TOP -0.001 0.000 -0.033 * -0.399 0.000 0.005 0.181 *** 947.8
EXECUTIVE1 0.006 0.000 -0.035 * 0.190 0.000 0.013 0.180 *** 974.7
EXECUTIVE2 -0.012 0.000 -0.035 * 0.209 0.000 0.011 0.181 *** 947.7
EXECUTIVE3 -0.001 0.000 -0.035 * -0.033 0.000 0.009 0.181 *** 947.4
EXECUTIVE4 0.003 0.000 -0.036 * 0.191 0.000 0.010 0.181 *** 947.4
EXECUTIVE 0.000 0.000 -0.035 * 0.081 0.000 0.009 0.181 *** 947.4
ORDINARY1 -0.003 0.000 -0.033 * -0.373 0.000 0.008 0.181 *** 948.0
ORDINARY2 -0.020 ** 0.000 -0.033 * -0.379 0.000 0.006 0.181 *** 950.0
ORDINARY3 -0.002 *** 0.000 -0.030 -0.621 0.000 0.008 0.181 *** 950.8
ORDINARY4 -0.003 0.000 -0.032 * -0.359 0.000 0.006 0.181 *** 948.3
ORDINARY -0.002 *** 0.000 -0.029 -0.785 0.000 0.007 0.181 *** 950.5
AUDITOR1 0.000 0.000 -0.035 * 0.080 0.000 0.011 0.181 *** 947.2
AUDITOR2 0.013 0.000 -0.036 * 0.158 0.000 0.010 0.181 *** 947.6
AUDITOR3 0.002 0.000 -0.036 * 0.542 0.000 0.010 0.180 *** 947.9
AUDITOR4 0.001 0.000 -0.035 * 0.129 0.000 0.011 0.181 *** 947.3
AUDITOR 0.001 0.000 -0.036 * 0.496 0.000 0.013 0.180 *** 947.6
INSIDER1 -0.001 0.000 -0.034 * -0.406 0.000 0.006 0.181 *** 947.6
INSIDER2 -0.011 * 0.000 -0.032 * -0.447 0.000 0.007 0.181 *** 949.3
INSIDER3 -0.001 0.000 -0.032 * -0.625 0.000 0.007 0.182 *** 948.4
INSIDER4 -0.001 0.000 -0.033 * -0.395 0.000 0.008 0.181 *** 947.8
INSIDER 0.000 0.000 -0.031 * -0.723 0.000 0.006 0.182 *** 948.4
DTOP1 0.000 0.000 -0.035 * 0.030 0.000 0.010 0.181 *** 947.2
DTOP2 -0.021 0.000 -0.034 * -0.188 0.000 0.013 0.181 *** 948.5
DTOP3 -0.002 0.000 -0.034 * -0.057 0.000 0.010 0.181 *** 947.3
DTOP4 -0.005 0.000 -0.033 * -0.041 0.000 0.012 0.181 *** 947.7
DTOP -0.007 0.000 -0.031 * -0.225 0.000 0.008 0.181 *** 947.9
DEXECUTIVE1 -0.003 0.000 -0.035 * 0.068 0.000 0.012 0.181 *** 947.4
DEXECUTIVE2 -0.018 0.000 -0.035 * 0.181 0.000 0.011 0.181 *** 947.9
DEXECUTIVE3 -0.009 0.000 -0.034 * -0.193 0.000 0.010 0.181 *** 947.9
DEXECUTIVE4 0.003 0.000 -0.036 * 0.150 0.000 0.011 0.181 *** 947.3
DEXECUTIVE -0.004 0.000 -0.035 * -0.055 0.000 0.010 0.181 *** 947.4
DORDINARY1 -0.008 0.000 -0.033 * -0.232 0.000 0.007 0.181 *** 947.9
DORDINARY2 -0.021 * 0.000 -0.033 * -0.285 0.000 0.008 0.181 *** 949.1
DORDINARY3 -0.013 ** 0.000 -0.028 -0.084 0.000 0.010 0.182 *** 949.5
DORDINARY4 -0.010 0.000 -0.031 * -0.218 0.000 0.010 0.181 *** 948.6
DORDINARY -0.015 ** 0.000 -0.027 -0.236 0.000 0.008 0.184 *** 949.5
DAUDITOR1 0.006 0.000 -0.035 * 0.368 0.000 0.010 0.180 *** 947.6
DAUDITOR2 0.003 0.000 -0.035 * 0.066 0.066 0.009 0.181 *** 947.3
DAUDITOR3 0.012 * 0.000 -0.035 * 0.867 0.000 0.007 0.176 *** 949.1
DAUDITOR4 0.005 0.000 -0.035 * 0.195 0.000 0.008 0.180 *** 947.5
DAUDITOR 0.014 ** 0.000 -0.035 * 1.195 0.000 0.009 0.174 *** 950.1
DINSIDER1 0.002 0.000 -0.036 * 0.243 0.000 0.010 0.180 *** 947.3
DINSIDER2 -0.016 * 0.000 -0.032 * -0.455 0.000 0.006 0.181 *** 949.1
DINSIDER3 -0.012 0.000 -0.031 * -0.442 0.000 0.008 0.188 *** 949.0
DINSIDER4 -0.012 * 0.000 -0.029 * -0.562 0.000 0.009 0.184 *** 948.8
DINSIDER -0.005 0.000 * -0.034 * -0.176 0.000 * 0.009 0.185 *** 948.6
note) In Tobit Model￿
E(y)=óI, where I￿￿á￿￿￿â/ó￿
The parameter ó will be called "normalized coefficient".
In this paper, vector á is the estimated coefficient.